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TEACHING NOTES
Right and Wrong, Balanced on the Edge of a Spear: U.S. Forces at a Mosque in Baghdad
By Joshua Potter∗
The purpose of this case is to provide a framework to understand the complex operational
environment facing a U.S. advisor team, and to equip the student to ask the right questions that
will help him or her to be prepared.
This case study will take students through the leadership challenges faced by an advisor team
in Iraq. The discussions are intended to provide an understanding of local politics, including an
appreciation for the expectations and needs of the people; to identify signs of corruption among
host-nation partners; and to assess how military assets and resources can be used to improve the
chances of operational success.
Target Audience:
•
military advisors;
•
members of a coalition military force;
•
international or military law students; and
•
cultural anthropologists assigned to Human Terrain Teams (HTTs).
Knowledge, Skills, and Attitudes to Be Developed

•
•
•

Knowledge
multicultural dimensions to complex problems in a conflict zone;
subtext of how Iraqi security forces intend to exercise authority and to change their
commanders;
indicators of a baited ambush;
impact of Sharia law on society; and
mosques as sites protected by international law, though that status can be tested.

•
•
•
•
•

Skills
use of influence with host-nation counterpart;
tactical decision-making;
force protection in a time-constrained environment;
preparation for possible counterattacks from the civilian population; and
understanding Iraqi military culture.

•
•

Attitudes
use host-nation forces (rather than U.S. forces) to clear a dangerous area;
enhance the legitimacy of host-nation security forces;

•
•

Joshua Potter is a Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) serving as a Battalion Commander of the 81st
Civil Affairs Battalion, Fort Hood, Texas. This case is based on the experience of the author,
who served as SHADOW 6 commander during the raid.
∗

•
•

achieve credibility in the eyes of the indigenous people; and
Build respect for protected sites.

ANALYSIS AND PROCESS
Challenge the target audience to adopt different roles in order to understand different
perspectives and critical issues.
Perspectives to Consider
• The Iraqi patrol leader
• The Iraqi commander;
• The U.S. commander;
• An embedded media reporter who arrives on location to interview the members of the
Iraqi Security Forces and U.S. forces working together
• The U.S. transition team chief (SHADOW 6); and
• The people of Abu Descheer, observing the unfolding operation.
Questions to Ask
Role of an Advisor
What is the relationship between the U.S. and Iraqi security forces?
How do we support and develop the host-nation security forces?
Perception of Legitimacy
Who holds the power in this scenario?
Are you willing to abdicate power for self-preservation?
Impact of Attacks against Civilians
Who wins when the bodies are left in the street?
Military Use of a Recognized Protected Site
What are the rules of engagement for a protected site (mosque).
Teaching Plan
Before class, distribute Handout 1. This handout provides situational reports faced by the
SHADOW team leader.
Handouts 2 and 3 can be distributed at the end of the case discussion and can lead the case
debrief.
An epilogue and report by the actual SHADOW 6 leader could serve as useful reference
points for class participants.
Introduction
Give the case to the class, and allow five minutes to read the material.
At the conclusion, show the video clip of the SHADOW team leader who faced this situation.
Identify the Actors: U.S. and Iraqi

Opening Questions
What is the situation?
What should SHADOW 6 do?
Change the Perspective
Place students in the role of the different actors identified above. What is the actor’s
perspective? Is the actor’s perspective influenced by other actors? How would the other actors
react to any action of SHADOW 6?
Follow up Questions
What rules of engagement should be applied?
Who holds the power in this scenario?
How can information operations (creative use by the media) be exploited in this scenario—
from all sides?1
Closure
Ask, “What is the ‘right’ answer?”
Distribute Handouts 2 and 3. Allow the class time to read the material, either for immediate
class discussion or for use in the case debriefing session.
Debriefing
Conduct a debriefing to capture lessons learned—a board plan is provided below. These lessons
may prove helpful in future training iterations.
Conclude the debriefing by answering the question, How did this case study change or shape
my perceptions or actions?
BOARD PLAN
BOARD 1: SHADOW 6 response and driving factors
BOARD 2: Implications of rules of engagement and who holds the power
BOARD 3: Use of information operations
BOARD 4: Additional considerations for further discussion, if time permits
BOARD 5: Lessons learned
ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND
The following provides responses to frequently raised points by the students when the author ran
the case. These responses may prove interesting in conducting the discussion.
Request additional U.S. military support.
It is not available. The U.S. commander in the area did not want to add to the quick reaction
force, other than the four Bradley fighting vehicles. The U.S. commander did not want to

force a decisive engagement in a mosque involving U.S. forces, and four heavily armored
Bradley fighting vehicles were deemed sufficient to rescue the U.S. MiTT if the situation
required an immediate extraction.
Request additional Iraqi military support.
It is not available. The Iraqi battalion commander was called by SHADOW 6 to explain
why his meager patrol force seemed ill-prepared for a serious raid that would likely end up
with heavy casualties without a sufficient show of force or back up force in the area. The Iraqi
battalion commander (from the Third Battalion, Fourth Public Order Brigade) ultimately cried
and said that he was sorry: “I am not permitted to send the right people to do this job.”
SHADOW 6 believed the public order brigade commander prevented sending a better Iraqi
force, with the full understanding that the raid mission would be handicapped from the start.
Request U.S. aircraft to support the operation.
Not available. The MiTT is not equipped with unmanned aerial vehicles, which are often
used in surveillance for this type of raid or urban assault missions. The U.S. attack helicopters
were not on station during this time frame—though they did appear around 1:00 a.m., when the
Iraqi special operations forces element attempted to conduct a raid on the same mosque. They
revealed several built-up bunkers in and around the mosque, which were considered wellprepared defensive positions.
Was the public order brigade openly affiliated with Jayish al-Mahdi?
Yes. Less than six weeks prior to this incident, the MiTT leadership had proved direct ties
between this public order battalion and Muqtada al-Sadr’s militia, Jayish al-Mahdi. The
public order brigade commander was replaced with Colonel Muhammed (from the case
study). This was a source of friction between the MiTT and the public order brigade
leadership; however, the MiTT and Colonel Muhammed had an excellent working
relationship. On the day following the Golden Shrine bombing, Jayish al-Mahdi agents
attacked and beat Colonel Muhammed’s eighteen-year-old son. This was a direct act of
intimidation, though SHADOW 6 and Colonel Muhammed worked well together.

1

From Chapter 3, Counterinsurgency Operations, Section IV Information Operations: “The Army
defines information operations as the employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare,
computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations
security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to affect or defend
information and information systems, and to influence decision making (FM 3-13). The goal of
IO is to gain and maintain information superiority at decisive points.” See
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-07-22/ch3-iv.htm (accessed
April 14, 2010).

